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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Volume VII Symposium 1990 Part Three
INTRODUCTION
by Nadine Strossen*
This year ... will be a watershed in the history of civil
rights laws -- whether for good, or for ill, the Congress
and the President will decide its future course. In
February of 1989 no one... could have imagined that the
Supreme Court could turn so dramatically away from the
national consensus in favor of vigorous enforcement of
federal equal opportunity laws. The Court has forcefully
reminded us all of how even the most clearly written of
statutes can be drained of practical effectiveness by a
crabbed, capricious interpretation.'
In a series of controversial decisions issued during its 1988-89
Term, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court undermined what had
previously seemed to be entrenched principles of civil liberties and civil
rights.2 Characteristically for the Rehnquist Court, there were no outright
reversals of prior cases on point.3 Rather, the Court achieved its rights-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. AB. 1972, Harvard-Radcliffe College;
J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
William T. Coleman, Jr., Chairman of the Board, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.).
2. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989).
3. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067-77 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
At every level of its review, . . . [including] its
intended evisceration of precedents and its
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eroding results indirectly, through revisionist reinterpretations of
constitutional provisions, statutory language and its own precedents.4
Dissenting Justices5 as well as commentators 6 have complained that these
rulings in effect rewrote not only the Court's own previous decisions, but
also congressional enactments.7
In unusually harsh tones, commentators deplored the formidable
incursions into personal freedom made by the 1988-89 Term decisions.8
For example, Norman Dorsen, Stokes Professor of Constitutional Law at
New York University and President of the American Civil Liberties Union,
said:
The United States Supreme Court['s] ... 1988 Term ...
struck an ominous blow against principles of civil liberties
and civil rights that seemed well-settled and secure only
a year ago. Indeed, the Bill of Rights fared worse during
this term than any other in recent memory. In many ways,
this Court is reminiscent of the Vinson Court of the early
deafening silence about the constitutional
protections that it would jettison, the plurality
obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned
restraint, the plurality announces that its analysis
leaves Roe [v. Wade] "undisturbed," albeit
"moditqied] and narrow[ed]." But this disclaimer
is totally meaningless. The plurality opinion is
filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances
to those who would do away with Roe explicitly.
Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper,"
the plurality discards a landmark case of the last
generation ....
Id. (citation omitted).
4. Id.
5.. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2-363, 2379-80 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J.); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109
S. Ct. 2261, 2270-72 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan and Blackmun,
JJ.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2127-29 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
6. See, e.g., Twenty-Five Years of the Civil Rights Act: History and Promise, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159, 174 (1990) [hereinafter Wake Forest Panel Discussion]
(remarks of Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.) ("Some might say that we are commemorating the demise of title VII [as
opposed to its twenty-fifth anniversary].").
7. Id.
8. Id. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 2.
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1960's, whose rulings regularly rejected strong
constitutional claims on a wide range of issues. 9
Further, Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., offered a similarly bleak assessment: "This was
one of the worst terms of Court that we have experienced in our lifetime
and it has been and will be devastating to victims of employment
discrimination."" The 1988-89 Term's negative impact on individual
rights was perhaps most succinctly captured in the apocalyptic but apt title
of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky's foreword to the Harvard Law Review
analysis of that Term: "The Vanishing Constitution.""
The Court's 1988-89 decisions, eroding individual rights, can be
grouped into two broad categories: first, decisions curtailingthe right to be
free from discrimination based on race, gender, or other invidious
classifications, as guaranteed by two major federal civil rights statutes --
the 186612 and 196413 Civil Rights Acts -- and prior Supreme Court cases
interpreting them; 14 and second, decisions curbing constitutionally
guaranteed civil and political liberties." For the sake of brevity, the first
9. N. Dorsen, Statement Regarding ACLU Summary of 1988 Supreme Court Term
(July 6, 1989) (unpublished).
10. Wake Forest Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 173 (remarks of Julius
Chambers).
11. Chemerinsky, supra note 2. See also Wake Forest Panel Discussion, supra note
6, at 173 (remarks of Julius Chambers).
12. The Reconstruction Era statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1972, 1981-1994 (1988).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-5 (1988))
[hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1964].
14. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); Public
Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) [hereinafter Civil Rights Decisions].
15. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Board of Trustees of the State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Sable
Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.
Ct. 2746 (1989), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct.
2333 (1989), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874
(1989); Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989); United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct.
1581 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Florida
v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) [hereinafter Civil Liberties Decisions].
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group of cases will be referred to as "civil rights" cases and the latter as
"civil liberties" cases.
This Symposium issue of the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights focuses on the first group of the Court's recent rights-
limiting decisions, those dealing with civil rights. The contributors to this
Symposium afford particularly interesting insights into these decisions,
because they bring to the relevant issues not only academic expertise, but
also extensive experience in litigating civil rights issues. From their dual
perspectives as scholars and activists, the Symposium contributors provide
trenchant criticism both of the opinions' theoretical reasoning and of their
adverse practical impact on discrimination victims.
Moreover, from their combined academic/activist vantage point,
these commentators are able to suggest possible strategies that
discrimination victims might employ to overcome the new obstacles that
the Court has interposed to their recovery. The most effective response
to the 1988-89 civil rights decisions would be new legislation to restore to
the anti-discrimination statutes the meanings they had before the Court's
rewriting. Congress is attempting such a restoration through the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1990.16
The fact that the Court's 1988-89 civil rights decisions have forced
Congress to pass legislation to reinstate its previously expressed will
17
teaches us two basic lessons. First, it underscores that the decisions
discussed in this Symposium are hardly hallmarks of judicial restraint,
notwithstanding the rhetoric of Chief Justice Rehnquist and his
16. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
In addition, Minnesota recently enacted a statute providing, as a matter of state anti-
employment-discrimination law, for certain remedies and procedures that the Supreme
Court had eliminated from federal anti-discrimination law. It was the first state to adopt
such legislative counter-measures to the Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term civil rights
decisions. See 1990 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 567 (West).
17. See Wake Forest Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 191 (remarks of Prof.
Eleanor Holmes Norton).
[W]e have essentially to go through the ritual of
1964 again. That is truly insulting. If Congress
wanted to repeal the Act, they know how to do
that. It wasn't up to the Court to do that, and I
think the Congress is put in the position where it
almost has to re-enact the Act or admit that the
act they passed was not what the courts [and
Congress] have said it was ... for 25 years.
[Vol. VII
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"conservative" allies."8 Second, the interactions between Congress and the
Court concerning the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1964, and 1990
demonstrate the potential efficacy of our tripartite governmental system for
protecting and promoting individual rights. 9
Concerning the first point, the civil rights decisions discussed in
this Symposium violate fundamental canons of judicial restraint and
conservativism, including the following principles: that the Court should
address only those questions which must be answered in order to resolve
the case before it;' that the Court should defer to judgments by elected
government officials;" and that the Court should abide by its own
precedents.22 Instead, in the cases analyzed in this Symposium,. the
Rehnquist block reached questions that were not squarely presented by the
facts at issue;' it ignored plain congressional language and legislative
history,24 and likewise nullified the judgment of an elected city council, 2
and it repudiated settled judicial constructions of statutory and
constitutional provisions.' In terms of their judicial activism, the civil
rights subset' of the 1988-89 Term's rights-limiting cases starkly contrasts
with the civil liberties subset.' In the latter, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
his ideological allies aggressively adhered to a central canon of judicial
18. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 46 ("The Rehnquist Court . . . approaches
judicial review based on an oft-stated desire to avoid judicial value imposition."). See also
id. at 64 ("The current Justices profess a desire to avoid overturning legislative or executive
decisions based on their personal preferences and generally rule in favor of the elected
branches of government.") (footnote omitted).
19. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUrIONAL LAW
§ 3.5 (3d ed. 1986).
20. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 352-53
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 345, 348, 354-55.
22. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 780-81 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
23. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (after briefing and
oral argument on issues raised by the parties, the Court requested briefing and argument
on whether its prior construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as it extends to private
discrimination, should be reconsidered).
24. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lorance v. AT &
T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2270-72 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2127-29 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
26. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
27. See Civil Rights Decisions, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. See Civil Liberties Decisions, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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restraint.29 They deferred to the elected branches of government,
including the Congress and city councils, in almost sycophantic fashion,
virtually abdicating judicial review.3
This Introduction will not describe in detail the manner in which
the Court's recent civil liberties decisions have hewed to an extremely
narrow vision of the appropriate judicial role, and embodied an
exaggerated form of judicial deference to determinations of elected
government officials."a However, a general understanding of the judicial
process employed in these civil liberties cases, and of its contrast with the
judicial process employed in the civil rights cases, places the latter in an
illuminating perspective.
Once we realize that the two groups of recent Supreme Court
cases concerning individual rights are not linked in terms of the judicial
process or analytical methodology they employ, but only in terms of their
rights-limiting results, the Rehnquist block's substantive ideological agenda
becomes glaringly apparent. In contrast with such a classic judicial
conservative as (the second) Justice Harlan, the new majority does not
consistently practice judicial restraint. Rather, it invokes tenets of judicial
passivism selectively, as asserted justifications for refusing to invalidate
majoritarian decisions that violate constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.
When the goal of limiting individual rights is better served by active
judicial review, however, through effectively invalidating statutes and
programs that advance civil rights, the Rehnquist block forsakes judicial
restraint. Accordingly, Justice Stevens, who can more rightfully claim to
be heir to Harlan's legacy of constraint, consistently decries the
"conservative" majority's judicial activism in pursuit of rights-restraining
results.32 The only thread that ties together all the 1988-89 civil rights
and civil liberties decisions is that they all leave individual rights less
29. See, e.g., Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345, 348, 354-55 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
30. See Strossen, Recent US. and International Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights:A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 891-94 (1990) (although the Rehnquist Court's civil liberties decisions paid obeisance
to principles of judicial passivism insofar as they deferred to majoritarian decisions, they
nonetheless violated those principles insofar as they unnecessarily resolved issues and
deviated from prior judicial rulings).
31. The author has chronicled these trends elsewhere. See id. at 866-903.
32. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 'Why the
Court undertakes these unwise changes in elementary and eminently fair rules is a mystery
to me." Id. at 2127-28 (accusing majority of betraying congressional purpose underlying
title VII in "its latest sojourn into judicial activism').
[Vol. VII
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secure than they were under previous judicial rulings."a
A second general lesson that can be derived from the Court's 1988-
89 civil rights rulings is their illustration of how our tripartite governmental
system provides potential safety nets for individual rights. At various
points in our history, the legislative and judicial branches of the federal
government have each stepped into the breach when the other has not
adequately protected civil rights or civil liberties.
For example, following the Civil War, Congress passed far-
reaching civil rights statutes, only to have them eviscerated by narrow
judicial constructions.34 Following World War II, these roles were
reversed. Congress kept a low profile in the civil rights area, but the
Supreme Court invalidated racially discriminatory laws and practices in a
series of decisions culminating with Brown v. Board of Education.5
A decade after Brown, Congress became an ally in the Court's
continuing battle to guarantee equal rights regardless of race or other
invidious classifications, by passing the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act.'
Under the stewardship of Chief Justices Warren and Burger, the Court
continued its collaboration with Congress in securing civil rights through
decisions that allowed the Act to be meaningfully implemented. 7 Yet
now, under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court is
33. For another example of the result-oriented nature of the Rehnquist Court's
approach to judicial process issues, see Chemerinsky, supra note 2.
Although for the past two decades
conservative scholars have championed originalist
constitutional interpretation, the Rehnquist Court
has not consistently followed this philosophy.
... One is left with the impression that
the Court is originalist only when it justifies the
result that the Court wants.
... Reading the [1988 Term] decisions
leaves one with the sense that the Court invokes
whatever interpretive method justifies a particular
decision, a criticism that is particularly trenchant
for a Court that professes a desire for judicial
neutrality.
Id. at 51-56 (footnote omitted).
34. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 13.
37. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 45.
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effectively, if not literally, overturning some of these decisions.'
For example, in 1971, pursuant to a unanimous opinion authored
by then Chief Justice Burger, the Court recognized that title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act39 prohibits employers from using selection criteria
that have a significant adverse impact on minorities or women.' A
prominent civil rights lawyer described Griggs v. Duke Power Co. as
"comparable [in the field of employment] to Brown in the field of
education."4 Yet, during its 1988-89 Term, pursuant to a five to four
decision, the Court effectively overruled Griggs.4
In seeking to counter the revisionist impact of the 1988-89 civil
rights decisions through the proposed 1990 Civil Rights Act,43 Congress
is acting consistently not only with its general responsibilities under our
system of separated government powers, but also with its special
responsibilities under the fourteenth amendment.' By so doing, Congress
helps to maintain traditions of liberty and equality which, throughout
United States history, have directly benefitted an increasingly broad
spectrum of American society, and which have served as models for other
societies as well. As we approach the Bicentennial of our Bill of Rights
in December 1991, and as other peoples around the world are invoking the
precepts it enshrines in their own efforts to entrench democracy and
human rights, it is especially ironic that the Court would forsake its time-
honored role as the guarantor of individual rights, and especially important
that Congress step into the breach. As Professor Dorsen declared: "At a
time when the doors of freedom are opening throughout the world, we
must not allow a backward-looking Supreme Court to close the door on
[civil rights and civil liberties]."45
38. See supra note 3. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
40. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 14 (testimony of William T. Coleman, Jr.).
42. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
43. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress express authority to adopt
appropriate legislation to enforce amendment).
45. N. Dorsen, supra note 9, at 19.
[Vol. VII
